Why do individuals borrow and save money at the same time? I present a model in which sophisticated time-inconsistent agents, when faced with a future investment opportunity, rationally choose to save their wealth and then borrow to fund the investment. The combination of savings and a loan generates incentives for future selves to invest optimally, by creating a new punishment for over-consumption. Agents thus use saving and borrowing to create a commitment device for their future selves. This paper contains two main results. First, I show that agents who simultaneously save and borrow can have higher lifetime welfare than those who don't. Second, I show that agents who have access to a non-secure savings technology can be better off than those who only have access to a secure savings technology.
Introduction
Why would an individual simultaneously save and borrow when the interest rate on saving is no higher than on borrowing? Given the prevalence of such behavior, several economic explanations, both traditional and behavioral, have been proposed. Traditional explanations usually rely on the option value of savings-under risky conditions, an agent might maintain savings for use in case of an emergency (if, for example, there are transaction costs with taking a loan on short notice, or if bankruptcy laws don't require the agent to repay a loan even if there are assets in the bank). Behavioral explanations, most notably Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2001), focus on illiquid savings as a self-control device. Agents lock assets for future consumption while smoothing short-term consumption with high-interest credit card debt.
In this paper, I propose an alternative model of simultaneous saving and borrowing. The model is motivated by a phenomenon observed among participants in FINCA, a microcredit organization in Peru. 1 I argue that, in this context, existing explanations of simultaneous borrowing and saving are insufficient. As in Laibson et al, agents have time-inconsistent preferences, but in this model savings serve a different purpose. I exploit the fact that informal savings accounts are not entirely secure-this allows agents to generate uncertainty that can improve the behavior of future selves. I show that the combination of an non-secure savings technology and a future investment opportunity can induce an agent to borrow and save simultaneously, and that this behavior is not optimal if either of these elements is absent. I also show that access to non-secure savings can make an agent better off than if savings are always secure.
Description of the Model
In this section, I discuss existing explanations and broadly describe the intuition of the model.
The goal of the model is to explain an individual's decision to make a savings and borrowing decision at the same time and in the same bank. I consider a banking structure that is common in developing countries, especially with informal microfinance institutions. Individuals can borrow 1 The appendix contains more detail on the motivating background. 1 money, which must be repaid by the end of a cycle. During this cycle, they can also save with the bank. Savings remain illiquid until the end of the cycle. There is a risk that agents who save with the bank will face an additional delay in getting their savings back.
The possibility that savings are maintained for their option value is unlikely for two reasons.
First, since the lender organization is the same as the borrower, it is not possible for an agent to default on a loan while still having access to her savings in the case of a negative shock.
Second, savings are relatively illiquid during a loan cycle. Then, if an agent has a sudden need for liquidity, it is not clear that it is easier for her to access her savings than it is to simply take out a fresh loan from the bank. Since alternative banking services are very limited, it is unlikely that a savings account with FINCA would be useful as collateral for other banks.
It also seems that, unlike in Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman, agents are not using savings for their illiquidity. In their model, agents save to ensure consumption in the distant future, and take out high-interest loans if they suffer income shocks. However, in our context, while savings are not liquid within a loan cycle, they can nevertheless be used to pay back loans at the end of a cycle. Also, agents make the decision to maintain debt and savings simultaneously, so the loans are not a response to an unanticipated shock after savings have been locked up.
In the following model, the agent is a quasi-hyperbolic discounter who has the opportunity to make an investment in the middle of her life. While her early selves would like her to invest, she is unwilling to make the sacrifice when the opportunity presents itself. The problem for the agent when young, then, is to leave enough liquid assets for her future selves while also creating an incentive to invest. I find that, in some cases, this can be done optimally by saving in the bank while also borrowing from it. Saving, then, is a source of uncertainty. If the agent saves her assets in the bank while leaving a large amount of borrowed money for future selves, those selves must decide whether to indulge their present-biased preferences and consume or to consume less and invest. If the money was not borrowed (or if savings were entirely secure), the middle-aged agent might choose to indulge. Now, however, indulgence becomes more costlysince it is possible that the agents savings will not be repaid, she risks being unable to pay back her own loans if she over-consumes today. If the punishment for default is sufficiently high, she will choose to invest. The young agent is able to use banking to generate costly punishments for "bad" behavior, thus ensuring that her future selves invest optimally. As long as savings are sufficiently secure (but not fully), the agent will simultaneously save and borrow.
Model

Assumptions
There is one individual who lives for 3 periods. As shown in the timeline below, there is no consumption in period 0 but banking decisions must be made at this time. In period 1, the agent can consume but also has the opportunity to invest. In period 2, savings mature, loans are repaid, and the agent consumes her remaining assets. The agent has an endowment w in period 0. The price of investment is p < w, and the monetary benefit of investment is b > p. The agent has a per-period utility function u, which is strictly concave and differentiable, with u (0) = 0 and u 0 (0) finite. The agent is a quasihyperbolic discounter with δ = 1 (the exponential discount factor) and 0 < β ≤ 1 (the hyperbolic discount factor).
If banking services are used, savings and borrowing takes place at an exogenous interest rate r (R ≡ 1 + r), such that x in period 0 yields Rx in period 2. If an agent saves with the bank, the savings disappear with some probability ε. This is also taken as exogenous at this stage. If an agent does not repay her loan in full, her current savings are seized and she faces a punishment of F . This can be interpreted as sanctions (financial or monetary) or restricted access to future banking services. I assume that F is large enough that it is always worth reducing consumption to avoid default. 2 
Exponential Case
As a benchmark case, I assume β = 1. Here, an agent has time-consistent preferences and behaves like an exponential discounter. If there is no banking, she will invest in period 1 (I assume from here on that it is worthwhile to invest):
ow suppose the agent has access to banking as described above. If there was no investment to be made, she would save s b (in the bank) and s (in period 1) to satisfy:
She will not borrow any money since this will be seized in case of default anyway (assuming punishment is sufficiently large that she will not default).
Now we can bring back the possibility of investment. The agent will borrow to fund consumption in period 1:
Assume R is low enough here that there is no incentive to save.
No Investment Case
Now I turn to the agent of interest-the quasi-hyperbolic discounter (β < 1). First, I analyze behavior in the absence of the investment opportunity. In the case without banking, there is no action the period 0 agent can take. The agent in 1 will save s * for consumption in period 2 according to:
This will involve lower saving that the period 0 agent would like. Now suppose banking is available. The agent in 0 would like to improve period 2 consumption. First, why would she not borrow money? Suppose she borrowed money in 0. She would do this only if it would induce agent 1 to save more. The agent in 1 will save more than in the no-banking case only if there is inducement in the form of a period 2 threat. In this case, I
show that any outcome that would be achieved by a combination of borrowing and saving can be achieved (or improved on) by simply saving less and borrowing 0.
Proposition 1 When there is no investment to be made, the agent will never borrow in period 0.
Proof. Suppose the agent in 0 saves some amount s b and borrows l > 0. The period 1 wealth,
(to avoid default in the bad state). From the period 0 perspective, lifetime utility is:
Now, consider the same s b as above, but change the loan tol = 0. The period 1 wealth iŝ
Consider the following consumption and savings in period 1:
This is an outcome where the agent in 1 consumes what was previously interest on the loan, while leaving period 2 consumption unchanged. This gives us a lower bound on welafare from the period 0 perspective (if the agent in 1 deviates from this plan, it will be to transfer more consumption to period 2).
Utility from the period 0 perspective is bounded below by:
The utility in 3 is strictly higher than the utility in 2.
Then, the agent in 0 will save s b to satisfy:
Investment Case without Banking
I assume here that, in the absence of banking, the agent in 1 will not invest:
where the LHS is the agent's optimal saving behavior as described in Equation 1.
Investment Case with Banking
This is the case of interest. Since an investment needs to be made in period 1, good behavior requires that the agent have enough available money for it, and that there be sufficient incentive for her to do so. First, we know that agent 0 can simply use saving to at least ensure the no-investment banking outcome described above. Assume again that F is high enough that the agent will repay the loan if at all possible.
I use backward induction to analyze this problem and solve for the Markov Perfect Equilibrium: in each period, the agent observes state variables (assets in each account), and makes an investment/consumption/savings decision.
Suppose the agent chose s b = 0 and l = 0 in period 0. Then, the only decision that remains to be made is a saving amount in period 1. If this amount exceeds p, then the investment is made. The figures below depict period 2 utility and period 1 utility, each as a function of period 1 saving, s. Now, suppose the optimal behavior without banking is some s < p from the period 1 perspective, but s = p (i.e. the investment is made) from the period 0 perspective. This means that, if the agent in period 0 could control future behavior, she would choose some loanl to compensate agent 1 for the cost of investment, while ensuring that investment actually does happen. However, given that agent 1 is free to make her investment decision, if she is sufficiently hyperbolic she would rather consume more (and not invest) than consume the amount necessary to invest.
Consider the decision in period 1. The agent has wealth W 1 = w +l and must to consume some amount c 1 to maximize her discounted sum of period 1 and period 2 utilities. If c 1 is small enough, the investment is made. Since the agent is a quasi-hyperbolic discounter, her realized behaviour might differ from her period 0 optimal behavior. In particular, in period 1, she might be tempted to save s < p (and therefore not invest) even if the agent in period 0 takes a loan of l to raise her consumption. 
W 1 Rl
Period 2 utility if period 0 takes a loan As l rises, period 1's marginal benefit of saving relative to marginal cost of saving increases with loan size. However, a loan ofl might not be sufficient to induce investment. Then, the agent in period 0 has access to three types of actions:
1. Increase l so that the agent in period 1 has an incentive to invest.
2. Give up on investing and save some amount s b in the bank.
3. Simultaneously save and borrow. This creates a threat for the period 1 agent-if she does not invest, there is a possibility that she will be unable to pay her loan in period 2. If F is large, this threat can create incentives to invest.
The following thought experiment illustrates the case when option 3 is optimal. Suppose, starting at s b = 0 and l =l, the agent in period 0 was to increase l and s b simultaneously and period 2 utility as a function of s will move down. On the graph below, the broken line represents the base case (s b = 0 and l =l). The lowest segment is the region in which the agent in period 2 might default. The middle segment is the case where there is no chance of default, and the investment is not made. The uppermost segment describes the case where the investment is made in period 1.
Period 2 utility as Period 0 raises loan and savings simultaneously Suppose, at s b = 0 and l =l, the agent in period 1 chooses some amount Rl < s < p. In this case, she is avoiding default but not making the investment. Suppose the agent in 0 saves more and borrows more. Now, period 2 utility is represented by the unbroken curve (the region in which default is possible expands). If agent 1 continues to save her original amount, she might face punishment in period 2. To prevent this, she must raise the amount she saves. Here, it can become optimal for the agent to invest. Note that if ε is low, the final outcome is close to the optimal outcome (from the perspective of period 0).
In this case, saving creates the incentive to invest, while borrowing is used to actually fund the investment.
Proposition 2 There is a parameter region in which the agent will save s 0 > 0 and borrow l > 0 in period 0.
Proof. First, consider the (period 0) optimal outcome under investment:
Now, consider the optimal outcome if no investment could be made:
Define the actual outcome if no investment is made as U save .
Consider the outcome if the agent does not plan to invest. She will save some s b in period 0 that satisfies:
By the assumption that investment is worthwhile, and since the agent in 1 is maximizing a different utility function than in 0, we know: U best > U save−best > U save .
Consider the minimuml ≥l that satisfies:
This gives the following utility:
t must be the case that: U loan ≤ U best .
The optimal pure-saving or pure-borrowing strategy yields a utility that is lower than the true optimal by some amount D, which is given by:
There is a lower bound on D that does not depend on ε (set ε = 0 in Condition 6a). Call
Now consider borrowing l * =l + w and saving s * b = w. Period 1's utility from not investing is:
If the agent invests (assuming R ¡l + w ¢ ≤ b), period 1 utility is:
The period 0 utility if period 1 invests is:
Given this β and ε, suppose F is high enough that V yes > V no . In this case, the simultaneous saving and borrowing strategy is preferred to a pure-saving or pure-borrowing strategy by the agent in 0.
The actual optimal point will not involve pinning the agent in 1 to the original optimal consumption. Consider a deviation that leads to a change in c 1 . If the agent lowers l, she must raise s b to maintain incentives for agent 1 to invest (and vice versa). First, we consider a drop in l and a corresponding rise in s b . This lowers W 1 , which results in a lowering of c 1 and raising of c 2 . While this brings the marginal utilities of consumption between the two periods closer to each other, it also lowers the total amount of wealth to be shared. Alternatively, consider a rise in l and a drop in s b . While this raises c 1 and lowers c 2 (thus pushing marginal utilities further apart), the change in c 1 is greater than the change in c 2 .
To determine the actual savings-loan combination used in equilibrium, let s b (l) be the level of savings required to maintain investment incentives for any l. The marginal utility from raising l (from a period 0 perspective) is:
The agent will choose l and s b so that the above term is 0.
It is useful to note here that if, instead, the individual only had access to secure savings (at a lower interest rate), then she would never choose to borrow and save simultaneously. In this case, it is impossible for agent 0 to create a discontinuity in period 2 utility that gets exacerbated if agent 1 over-consumes. To induce her future self to save, she will have to create incentives by lowering the relative marginal cost of saving in period 1. Rather than use the costly device of saving and borrowing, she will simply borrow to the point where agent 1 is willing to save. This is because, in either case, the period 0 agent must appeal to the period 1 agent's incentive to invest without a new threat being created. To see this, consider any loan-savings combination that induces investment. As shown in the proposition below, the agent in 0 can reduce both loan and savings in such a way that total wealth rises (less money is burned), and the benefits accrue to the period 1 agent. If the agent in period 1 has money at her disposal, her incentive to invest remains intact. Thus, investment continues to happen with less money wasted due to simultaneous saving and borrowing.
Proposition 3 Suppose the agent can borrow at interest rate r (R ≡ 1 + r) and can save at interest rate t (T = 1 + t), where r > t. Then she will never save and borrow simultaneously. If the agent in 0 does not plan to invest, she will either save her entire endowment or nothing at all. If (1 − ε) R ≥ 1, she will save 1. Otherwise she will save 0. This yields the following utility from the period 0 perspective:
Now consider the investment opportunity. Since the per-period utility functions are linear, the agent would prefer not to borrow. Since b > p, the investment is always preferred. This gives us the optimal utility level:
Now I look at the intra-personal equilibrium in the absence of banking. The agent in period 1 must decide whether to consume 1 or invest p and consume 1 − p. She will choose to invest if: p > βb. Suppose this condition fails. Now consider a pure loan to induce investment (we assume that F is large enough that the agent will never default). Then, the agent in 1 will invest if investment dominates just repaying the loan. Agent 1's utility from just repaying is:
Agent 1's utility from investment is: Since b > p, there will always be a loan that can induce investment. The smallest possible loan size, l A , is given by:
This yields the following utility for agent 0:
Now consider a loan l and savings of s 0 . We are interested in conditions under which this will raise agent 0's utility. Agent 0 will either choose to leave agent 1 with no consumption, or allow agent 1 to consume all leftover funds. Suppose she chooses to leave agent 1 with no extra consumption. Then W 1 = 1 − s 0 + l = p. Assume the agent in 0 will never take a loan so large that it cannot be repaid even under investment. Consider agent 1's utility from just repaying (without investing):
Her utility from repaying through investment is:
We know that
. This determines agent 0's optimal savings-loan combination:
If agent 0 prefers to allow the agent in 1 to consume the uninvested amount, she will not save any amount. Then, if the agent simultaneously saves and borrows, her utility in period 0
Implications
We are now in a position to predict the agent's optimal behavior based on exogenous parameter values: β, b, p, R, ε. The utility of the agent in period 0 from (a) no investment, (b) pure loan, and (c) loan and savings, is:
This gives us the following implications. First, the relative values of (b) and (c) depend entirely on (1 − ε) R. If ε goes down or R goes up, the agent is more likely to use simultaneous saving and borrowing (if she chooses to invest). If (1 − ε) R < 1, then the agent will either engage in no banking, or will invest using a pure loan. If (1 − ε) R > 1, then the agent will either save her entire wealth, or will use a combination of saving and borrowing to invest.
To find conditions under which the agent will invest at all, we compare (b) and (c) to (a).
Interestingly, I find that, in all cases, if R rises, the agent is more likely to invest. This is because it is now easier for the agent to create incentives for future selves to save. Also, as we would expect, the agent has a greater incentive to invest as the investment gets cheaper relative to the benefits.
Finally, as long as the punishment for default is sufficiently large, the agent is more likely to invest as ε drops. We see, then, that the hyperbolic agent is able arrive arbitrarily close to the optimal outcome if there is a very small possibility that her savings will not mature. The actual value of ε would depend on the number of agents in this setting who were not susceptible to punishment for default.
Conclusion
I have attempted to solve a puzzle of simultaneous borrowing and saving by providing a new rationale for this phenomenon. When agents are sophisticated hyperbolic discounters, access to a non-secure source of saving can be useful-by creating the threat of a large punishment in the event of default, the agent can induce her future selves to invest. Actual utility loss in equilibrium is limited if the probability of default is low.
I have shown that, in this setting, simultaneous borrowing and saving cannot be optimal if agents have time-consistent preferences. I have also shown that, if savings are secure, an interest rate differential cannot explain this behavior. The agent is always better off when she simply borrows to fund investment. When there is a small chance that savings will disappear, the agent can find herself better off than if savings mature with certainty.
Appendix
A Motivating Background
FINCA provides banking services to the very poor in the cities of Lima and Ayacucho. The majority of its clients are women who own and operate small informal businesses. Individuals are allowed to take out loans which must be repaid over a 4-month loan cycle. The average loan is $203, and is typically used for business investment purposes (often inventory). All borrowers are required to also maintain a savings account. The saving is intra-group-i.e. an agent who saves is giving a loan to some other FINCA member. Savings and borrowing take place at the same fixed interest rate. When agents save internally, they effectively get a lower return than they pay on their loans because there is some risk of their savings being defaulted upon. For any agent who does not repay a loan, the punishment (apart from the seizure of assets from the savings account) includes expulsion from future access to the bank.
In his work on FINCA, Karlan finds that a significant proportion of borrowers maintain savings that are above the required minimum. At any time, 15% save more than they borrow (30% have done this at some time). This behavior is most common in Ayacucho, where incomes are relatively low and access to credit is mostly limited to moneylenders who charge high interest rates.
B Differential Interest Rates
Statement of Proposition 3: Suppose the agent can borrow at interest rate r (R ≡ 1 + r) and can save at interest rate t (T = 1 + t), where r > t. Then she will never save and borrow simultaneously.
Proof. The agent in 0 will either plan for the investment to be made, or not. If the investment is not made, clearly the optimal strategy is to save some amount s 0 such that:
In this case, no loan will be taken.
If the agent in 0 takes a loan, it must be to induce investment in period 1. Suppose the agent borrows l > 0 and saves s 0 > 0. It must be the case that the investment is made in period 1.
The utility from period 0 perspective is:
Now suppose we lower l and s 0 such that ∆s 0 = R T ∆l. The period 1 incentive to save rises. Utility from the period 0 perspective must go up.
